 |
| Image credit. |
Continued from here.
3. The Irreducibility
of Politics ‑ the Political Animal and Its Spontaneous Order (SO2)
Natural inequality among human beings, the need
to manage violence in and between groups and communities, the intrinsically
hierarchical nature of power and other factors turn man into a political
animal naturally engaged in political competition which includes the
struggle for structures of maximal power which, in turn, culminates in
the evolution of the modern state.
Politics and the state are a natural growth of long standing. While ambivalent and capable of regression they are nonetheless indispensable. Liberty changes the conditions of politics and the state.
Liberty fosters, indeed requires, the possibility of mass participation in the political processes, which involvement cannot be curtailed without curtailing liberty herself.
Democratic institutions and procedures (which ought not to be reduced to the act of election alone) tend to best fulfil the requirements of political participation in a free society.
Liberals who reject politics and the state appear to be taking a position that is incompatible with the basic principles of liberty. Ultimately, they are not facing up to the fact that a free society is an open-ended project in which liberal principles and prospects must prove themselves in a competition involving powerful rival views.
This is a natural and necessary condition of liberty, whose future is impossible to predict.
We are dealing with an instance of “nirvana fallacy” (Demsetz) when the fact that politics and the state are naturally imperfect and characterised by severe defects is taken to justify their complete disavowal or characterisation as in essence destructive.
Politics and the state are a natural growth of long standing. While ambivalent and capable of regression they are nonetheless indispensable. Liberty changes the conditions of politics and the state.
Liberty fosters, indeed requires, the possibility of mass participation in the political processes, which involvement cannot be curtailed without curtailing liberty herself.
Democratic institutions and procedures (which ought not to be reduced to the act of election alone) tend to best fulfil the requirements of political participation in a free society.
Liberals who reject politics and the state appear to be taking a position that is incompatible with the basic principles of liberty. Ultimately, they are not facing up to the fact that a free society is an open-ended project in which liberal principles and prospects must prove themselves in a competition involving powerful rival views.
This is a natural and necessary condition of liberty, whose future is impossible to predict.
We are dealing with an instance of “nirvana fallacy” (Demsetz) when the fact that politics and the state are naturally imperfect and characterised by severe defects is taken to justify their complete disavowal or characterisation as in essence destructive.
After all, the ambivalent nature of politics and the state is owing to
- the evolutionary character of politics and the state, i.e. their being a spontaneous order which in its entirety performs experiments without moral prejudice, and
- the class of issues – namely: conflict in human communities - that they are evolving to come to grips with.
Inherent deficiencies notwithstanding, politics and the state are necessary to
open access societies, being an inevitable prerequisite of what degree of
freedom man may be capable of attaining.
Politics and the state are not optional. They will happen irrespective of whether or not liberals deem it proper to influence the goings-on in that indispensable arena of human interaction.
Politics and the state are not optional. They will happen irrespective of whether or not liberals deem it proper to influence the goings-on in that indispensable arena of human interaction.
4. Contradictory Liberalism
– Contradicting Liberty
Hayek’s truncated variant of a theory of
spontaneous order (SO1) contradicts both
- fundamental conditions of freedom, as well as
- his own epistemological research programme.
4.1 Hayek’s Incomplete
Picture of Social Order
Wedded to an “economistic” concept of
spontaneous order, Hayek effectively cuts out a whole dimension of social order
from his vision. Most notably, he fails to appreciate that “the market model”
(Vanberg) of human interaction, which is more or less expressly his paradigm of
all social order, is incapable of solving social conflict.
Markets presuppose social conditions that allow for non-violent encounters.
It is first and foremost the attenuation of conflict that drives the evolution of social order.
Trade not only presupposes peaceful social relations, it is also incapable of providing solutions to a whole range of other social challenges that need to be dealt with by arrangements of a different kind, such as the “pooling of resources” (Vanberg[1]), that contribute momentously to social order.
Thus, prior to, as well as alongside the spontaneous order of market transactions (SO1), other spontaneous orders (SO2) have evolved to cope with the two most fundamental problems of social order: violence and trust-building.
Hayek does not take cognizance of the fact that SO2 forms the substratum order in which SO1 is embedded, and fails to recognise SO2 in its formative impact on SO1.
Thus, Hayek’s picture of social order is crucially incomplete. Though, in his correspondence with Henry Simons and Walter Eucken[2], Hayek seems to intimate the need to add to his critique of detrimental interventions in SO1 a positive theory of legitimate political and governmental action, a “positive complement,” as he calls it.
However, his efforts at moving in that direction are rudimentary and contradictory, in fact, downright erratic in that he treads out a veering path between rejecting politics and the state on some occasions and taking them for granted on others, pursuing a wavering course that leads him to commute between (a) what Michael Oakeshott[3] once called Hayek’s “plan to resist all planning” and (b) what Richard Epstein[4] perceives to be “Hayek’s socialism.”
Markets presuppose social conditions that allow for non-violent encounters.
It is first and foremost the attenuation of conflict that drives the evolution of social order.
Trade not only presupposes peaceful social relations, it is also incapable of providing solutions to a whole range of other social challenges that need to be dealt with by arrangements of a different kind, such as the “pooling of resources” (Vanberg[1]), that contribute momentously to social order.
Thus, prior to, as well as alongside the spontaneous order of market transactions (SO1), other spontaneous orders (SO2) have evolved to cope with the two most fundamental problems of social order: violence and trust-building.
Hayek does not take cognizance of the fact that SO2 forms the substratum order in which SO1 is embedded, and fails to recognise SO2 in its formative impact on SO1.
Thus, Hayek’s picture of social order is crucially incomplete. Though, in his correspondence with Henry Simons and Walter Eucken[2], Hayek seems to intimate the need to add to his critique of detrimental interventions in SO1 a positive theory of legitimate political and governmental action, a “positive complement,” as he calls it.
However, his efforts at moving in that direction are rudimentary and contradictory, in fact, downright erratic in that he treads out a veering path between rejecting politics and the state on some occasions and taking them for granted on others, pursuing a wavering course that leads him to commute between (a) what Michael Oakeshott[3] once called Hayek’s “plan to resist all planning” and (b) what Richard Epstein[4] perceives to be “Hayek’s socialism.”
4.2 Liberalism’s Loss
of Identity – Torn between Social Democracy and Anarchism
Rather than being in danger of socialist or
social democratic aberrations, it appears that contemporary followers of
Austrian-inspired liberalism take their inspiration from the crypto-anarchist
strand in Hayek’s work.
By crypto-anarchism we mean an attitude of permanent and exclusive denunciation of politics and the state.
A crypto-anarchist may not consider herself an anarchist, someone who demands the abolition of the state, but she may effectively fail to acknowledge any benefits from state structures and governmental action, implicitly favouring the withering away of the state as her preferred strategy for societal improvement.
Overall Hayek’s wavering course regarding the nature of politics and the state does little to offer liberalism a third way between the two main frontiers of ideological dissolution confronting it: in the realm of practical politics, liberalism tends to (1) merge with the social democratic mainstream, while in smaller apolitical and intellectual circles it is (2) being absorbed by anarchism. It is not surprising that liberalism is getting gobbled up at these two opposed ends, for it does not provide much orientation in the world of intermediary conditions, the sphere where political principles must prove themselves in the face of concrete conditions, leaving the political initiative in practical politics to its rivals.
At the same time, liberalism’s strong presumption against politics and the state promotes an affinity with the anarchist vision of a stateless world, where markets are expected to provide the peaceful cohesion of a desirable social order.
By crypto-anarchism we mean an attitude of permanent and exclusive denunciation of politics and the state.
A crypto-anarchist may not consider herself an anarchist, someone who demands the abolition of the state, but she may effectively fail to acknowledge any benefits from state structures and governmental action, implicitly favouring the withering away of the state as her preferred strategy for societal improvement.
Overall Hayek’s wavering course regarding the nature of politics and the state does little to offer liberalism a third way between the two main frontiers of ideological dissolution confronting it: in the realm of practical politics, liberalism tends to (1) merge with the social democratic mainstream, while in smaller apolitical and intellectual circles it is (2) being absorbed by anarchism. It is not surprising that liberalism is getting gobbled up at these two opposed ends, for it does not provide much orientation in the world of intermediary conditions, the sphere where political principles must prove themselves in the face of concrete conditions, leaving the political initiative in practical politics to its rivals.
At the same time, liberalism’s strong presumption against politics and the state promotes an affinity with the anarchist vision of a stateless world, where markets are expected to provide the peaceful cohesion of a desirable social order.
5. Indeterminacy of Freedom
5.1 From
Anthropocentric Freedom to Sociogenic Freedom
In so far as freedom is a human disposition
inherent in every individual, in this paper we refer to it as anthropocentric freedom.
The human individual cannot survive without the ability to act autonomously.
Anthropocentric freedom, however, is no guarantee for sociogenic freedom, a condition, whereby by virtue of adopting generally applicable rules of a certain kind all members of a community are systematically protected from arbitrary interference.
The anthropocentric propensity for freedom is a mainspring for human action, both of the kinds averse to freedom and those conducive to her.
Sociogenic freedom comes late in human development; it is the result of conscious effort and design, of negotiation, educated trial and error, but also in large measure the result of unauthored growth and unintended consequences. In a word: it is part and parcel of a spontaneous order (SO2) more comprehensive than and thus enclosing Hayek’s SO1.
The more primordial condition of anthropocentric freedom – the impulse of a human to ensure scope for her own autonomous action – is at the bottom of the eternal tug-of-war between freedom and unfreedom.
Constituting in essence avoidance, circumvention or resistance in the face of unfreedom, freedom is a reactive force that presupposes unfreedom.
Offering tolerance vis-à-vis activities inspired by disparate values and objectives, freedom also tends to promote unfreedom. In that way, freedom is always intertwined with unfreedom or, indeed, other conditions that belong to neither category but impact their relative strength.
There can never be “no freedom at all” – thanks to anthropocentric freedom; but there can never be “total freedom” either, not least because freedom in its culturally most advanced form, i.e. sociogenic freedom, is freedom to disagree, freedom to develop differently, freedom to pursue diverging goals.
There is neither an objective standard by which to judge the purity and completeness of freedom, nor a power to enforce the presumption of an ideal state of liberty.
Liberty is by its nature incomplete and contestable; the forms in which it may materialise are changeable and in principle impossible to predict. Freedom is fundamentally indeterminate.
The human individual cannot survive without the ability to act autonomously.
Anthropocentric freedom, however, is no guarantee for sociogenic freedom, a condition, whereby by virtue of adopting generally applicable rules of a certain kind all members of a community are systematically protected from arbitrary interference.
The anthropocentric propensity for freedom is a mainspring for human action, both of the kinds averse to freedom and those conducive to her.
Sociogenic freedom comes late in human development; it is the result of conscious effort and design, of negotiation, educated trial and error, but also in large measure the result of unauthored growth and unintended consequences. In a word: it is part and parcel of a spontaneous order (SO2) more comprehensive than and thus enclosing Hayek’s SO1.
The more primordial condition of anthropocentric freedom – the impulse of a human to ensure scope for her own autonomous action – is at the bottom of the eternal tug-of-war between freedom and unfreedom.
Constituting in essence avoidance, circumvention or resistance in the face of unfreedom, freedom is a reactive force that presupposes unfreedom.
Offering tolerance vis-à-vis activities inspired by disparate values and objectives, freedom also tends to promote unfreedom. In that way, freedom is always intertwined with unfreedom or, indeed, other conditions that belong to neither category but impact their relative strength.
There can never be “no freedom at all” – thanks to anthropocentric freedom; but there can never be “total freedom” either, not least because freedom in its culturally most advanced form, i.e. sociogenic freedom, is freedom to disagree, freedom to develop differently, freedom to pursue diverging goals.
There is neither an objective standard by which to judge the purity and completeness of freedom, nor a power to enforce the presumption of an ideal state of liberty.
Liberty is by its nature incomplete and contestable; the forms in which it may materialise are changeable and in principle impossible to predict. Freedom is fundamentally indeterminate.
5.2 Liberty
‑ An Unintended Consequence
The history of freedom is a story of ambiguous,
ambivalent and unlikely support. There is ample evidence pointing in that
direction. Deepak Lal[5]
reminds us that the See of Rome’s egotistical efforts entirely unrelated to the
cause of freedom would eventually engender necessary conditions for a culture
of unprecedented freedom in Europe: (1) the destruction of the system of kinship
by the church (Gregory I) to get hold of individual inheritances in the 7th
century, giving vital impetus to modern individualism, a unique characteristic
of European culture compared to any other high culture worldwide, and the
endeavours (2) to found a church state in the 10th century (Gregory
VII), which induced the Catholic church to turn itself into the first
multinational concern in human history, in the process of which the modern
concept of law – foundational for modern capitalism and freedom - was born, as
minutely recorded in Harold Berman’s magisterial “Law and Revolution.”[6]
These are instances of a spontaneous order of the SO2 type at work, full of unintended consequences and crucial, yet unauthored developments, but also offering evidence of the pivotal role of conscious design in promoting liberty, as instructively laid out in historical research such as Gerhard Wegner’s “Capitalist transformation without political participation – German capitalism in the first half of the 19th century.”[7]
These are instances of a spontaneous order of the SO2 type at work, full of unintended consequences and crucial, yet unauthored developments, but also offering evidence of the pivotal role of conscious design in promoting liberty, as instructively laid out in historical research such as Gerhard Wegner’s “Capitalist transformation without political participation – German capitalism in the first half of the 19th century.”[7]
Constructivism, so brilliantly critiqued in
Hayek’s work, remains a strong trend in liberal thinking – ultimately, in
Hayek’s thought, too.[8]
One may surmise that it is these silhouettes of constructivist rationalism that
Michael Oakeshott had in mind when he referred to Hayek’s “plan to resist all
planning.”
Indubitably, there is a strong inclination in many Austrian-inspired thinkers to conceive of liberty as reducible to a first-best set of principles, whose knowledgeable observance ensures entry into the world as it ought to be[9].
In reality, freedom is naturally indeterminate, equivocal, and contestable.
She does not represent a closed system, but a platform on which to act out inevitable strife and contention, while endeavouring to reduce the level of attendant damage. Many of the causes of her fluctuating efficaciousness are unknown.
Freedom must constantly find out about herself. The degree of freedom prevailing at any time and place may be gauged and portrayed by qualitative descriptions of such reasonable precision as to make meaningful discourse possible; but freedom cannot be reduced to a precise formula, a uniform, complete, and unequivocal set of criteria indicating her uniquely desirable presence.
Freedom is a competitive process whose apple of discord is the meaning and extension of freedom itself.
Indubitably, there is a strong inclination in many Austrian-inspired thinkers to conceive of liberty as reducible to a first-best set of principles, whose knowledgeable observance ensures entry into the world as it ought to be[9].
In reality, freedom is naturally indeterminate, equivocal, and contestable.
She does not represent a closed system, but a platform on which to act out inevitable strife and contention, while endeavouring to reduce the level of attendant damage. Many of the causes of her fluctuating efficaciousness are unknown.
Freedom must constantly find out about herself. The degree of freedom prevailing at any time and place may be gauged and portrayed by qualitative descriptions of such reasonable precision as to make meaningful discourse possible; but freedom cannot be reduced to a precise formula, a uniform, complete, and unequivocal set of criteria indicating her uniquely desirable presence.
Freedom is a competitive process whose apple of discord is the meaning and extension of freedom itself.
6. Incomplete and
Contradictory – Hayek’s Account of Politics and the State
In the absence of a developed account of the
dynamic world of politics and the state,
Hayek sets forth mutually incompatible positions vis-à-vis the nature and
proper function of the state, (1) rejecting politics
and the state ‑ as he does in the
case of currency competition ‑, (2) aiming to eliminate their operation to the
utmost extent ‑ as in his deliberations
on a private law society ‑, and (3) taking politics
and the state for granted as the organiser of a welfare state.
The former two positions seem to correspond to what Oakeshott called Hayek’s “plan to resist all planning,” the latter being the target of Epstein’s stricture of statist propensities in Hayek.
Politics and the state are regarded either a source of aberration, dysfunction or downright evil, or they are basically ignored as a force affecting the policy proposals that Hayek advances.
Thus, in order to overcome the shortcomings of the parliamentary system that to him constitutes a “Schacherdemokratie” (a hagglers’ democracy), he proposes a bicameral legislature, consisting of one branch ‑ (L1), setting the basic rules of the game, “the general and abstract rules of just conduct” that ensure a liberal society in his view ‑, and a second branch – (L2) – charged to strictly harness and oversee concrete government action under the rules laid down by L1[10].
However, Hayek makes absolutely no effort to explain why L1 should be populated by citizens representing his notion of a liberal society, or why they should never disagree amongst themselves with regard to these principles or have occasion to change them over time, just as it has happened in the “Schacherdemokratien” so disliked by him.
His policy proposal is nearly void of any empirical consideration in terms of feasibility, hence utterly lacking in realism, being basically a projection of the preferences he happens to personally entertain.
Similarly, in supporting currency competition, Hayek’s desire to get government out of the monetary system is glaringly evident[11], but it is not clear at all why government should be inclined to follow his advice. How does he propose to marshal the political forces of a “Schacherdemokratie” to endorse and implement his vision, enduringly and in faithful fashion?
It appears only when challenged later on, does Hayek seem to take politics and the state into consideration, however only ad hoc, as an afterthought pronounced on being challenged[12]. He does not seem to be particularly sensitive to the idea that any monetary system will have to be monitored and managed politically in some form or other, owing to the mere fact that in a free society with no despotic restrictions on (mass) political participation, people will feel entitled and free to take a stance on an issue as vital as money. There is no escape from politics and the state, and this holds for currency competition just as well as for any other monetary regime under discussion.
The former two positions seem to correspond to what Oakeshott called Hayek’s “plan to resist all planning,” the latter being the target of Epstein’s stricture of statist propensities in Hayek.
Politics and the state are regarded either a source of aberration, dysfunction or downright evil, or they are basically ignored as a force affecting the policy proposals that Hayek advances.
Thus, in order to overcome the shortcomings of the parliamentary system that to him constitutes a “Schacherdemokratie” (a hagglers’ democracy), he proposes a bicameral legislature, consisting of one branch ‑ (L1), setting the basic rules of the game, “the general and abstract rules of just conduct” that ensure a liberal society in his view ‑, and a second branch – (L2) – charged to strictly harness and oversee concrete government action under the rules laid down by L1[10].
However, Hayek makes absolutely no effort to explain why L1 should be populated by citizens representing his notion of a liberal society, or why they should never disagree amongst themselves with regard to these principles or have occasion to change them over time, just as it has happened in the “Schacherdemokratien” so disliked by him.
His policy proposal is nearly void of any empirical consideration in terms of feasibility, hence utterly lacking in realism, being basically a projection of the preferences he happens to personally entertain.
Similarly, in supporting currency competition, Hayek’s desire to get government out of the monetary system is glaringly evident[11], but it is not clear at all why government should be inclined to follow his advice. How does he propose to marshal the political forces of a “Schacherdemokratie” to endorse and implement his vision, enduringly and in faithful fashion?
It appears only when challenged later on, does Hayek seem to take politics and the state into consideration, however only ad hoc, as an afterthought pronounced on being challenged[12]. He does not seem to be particularly sensitive to the idea that any monetary system will have to be monitored and managed politically in some form or other, owing to the mere fact that in a free society with no despotic restrictions on (mass) political participation, people will feel entitled and free to take a stance on an issue as vital as money. There is no escape from politics and the state, and this holds for currency competition just as well as for any other monetary regime under discussion.
[1] For
Vanberg’s full account of the relationship between “market model” and
“resource-pooling” see Vanberg, V. (1982), Markt
und Organisation, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
[2] Kolev, S. (2014), Does liberty need a constitution?
in Institute of Economic Affairs, (August 2014) http://www.iea.org.uk/blog/does-liberty-need-a-constitution.
[3] Oakeshott, M. (1991), Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, With a Foreword by
Timothy Fuller, Indianpolis, IN:
Liberty Press,
p. 26.
[4] Epstein, R. (1999), Hayek`s Socialism, Maryland Law Review, Volume 58, Issue 1.
[5] Lal, D. (1998), Unintended Consequences. The Impact of Factor Endowments, Culture, and
Politics on Long-Run Economic Performance, Cambridge, MA:MIT
Press, pp. 69-95.
[6] Berman, H. (1983), Law and Revolution. The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
[7] Wegner, G. (2013), Capitalist transformation without political participation – German
capitalism in the first half of the 19th century, Walter Eucken Institut,
13/14 Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics
[8] Hayek’s concept of the spontaneous order of a liberal
society is based on his idea of the rule of law and its underlying “rules of
just conduct,” the latter receiving their purported unified and
non-contradictory qualities by satisfying certain criteria, most notably the
criterion of universalizability. Hayek’s formal characterization of liberal law
amounts to a rationalist simplification of the range and the dynamics of the
forces acting on law, and the effect that law has on society. For more see:
Hayek, F. (1976), Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Vol. 2, The Mirage of Social Justice, Chicago, IL:
Chicago University Press; pp. 27-29.
[9] Also, consider “apriorism” in von Mises
(“praxeology”), Rothbard (with his attempt of an axiomatic version of “natural
rights” theory), and numerous libertarian writers subscribing more or less to
the Misesian or the Rothbardian approach, or proposing their own apriorism.
[10] Hayek, F. (1979), Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Vol. 3,
The Political Order of a Free People, Chicago,
IL: Chicago
University Press; pp.
98-104 on „The Miscarriage of the Democratic Ideal …,“ and pp. 105-127 on „The Model Constitution.“
[11] Howard, D. (1977), The Denationalisation of Money. A Review. (October 2014)
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/1977/102/ifdp102.pdf
No comments:
Post a Comment